Book Review: Choosing Elites: Selecting the  Best and the Brightest  at Top Universities and Elsewhere. by Robert Klitgaard. by Bouchard Jr., Thomas J.




Book Review: Choosing Elites: Selecting the "Best
and the Brightest" at Top Universities and
Elsewhere. by Robert Klitgaard.
Thomas J. Bouchard Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Constitutional
Commentary collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bouchard Jr., Thomas J., "Book Review: Choosing Elites: Selecting the "Best and the Brightest" at Top Universities and Elsewhere. by
Robert Klitgaard." (1986). Constitutional Commentary. 1076.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/concomm/1076
632 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 3:624 
tists to be "no more dependable in the quest for social justice than 
other citizens .... [and] primarily responsive to majority fashion, 
prejudices, and power." What had happened, of course, was that 
the issue of de jure Southern segregation had been replaced by the 
issue of "school busing," a much more controversial question in the 
academy. 
Judges often are left to pick and choose among conflicting 
opinions to justify their decisions, or, as the Supreme Court did in 
the exclusionary rule and capital punishment cases, to ignore the 
social scientific findings as hopelessly inconclusive. The level of dis-
sensus in the scholarly community is no doubt disconcerting to law-
yers and social scientists alike. It means that there is no objective 
science of society to which the courts can tum. Social research can-
not rescue the courts from the dilemma of how to make political 
judgments in a principled fashion. 
CHOOSING ELITES: SELECTING THE "BEST AND 
THE BRIGHTEST" AT TOP UNIVERSITIES AND 
ELSEWHERE. By Robert Klitgaard.l New York: Basic 
Books. 1985. Pp. 267. $19.95. 
Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr. 2 
In his Bakke opinion, Justice Lewis Powell presented the ad-
mission process at Harvard College as a model worthy of 
emulation: 
The experience of other university admission programs, which take race into ac-
count in achieving the educational diversity valued by the First Amendment, dem-
onstrates that the assignment of a fixed number of places to a minority group is not 
a necessary means toward that end. An illuminating example is found in the 
Harvard College program.3 
A consensus as to the merits of the Harvard model was, how-
ever, not achieved by the Justices. Justice Harry Blackmun argued, 
"I am not convinced, as Mr. Justice Powell seems to be, that the 
difference between the Davis program and the one employed by 
Harvard is very profound or constitutionally significant. The line 
between the two is a thin and indistinct one. In each, subjective 
application is at work."4 
I. Associate Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University. 
2. Professor of Psychology, University of Minnesota. 
3. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978). 
4. /d. at 406. 
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The information about Harvard's admission program was pro-
vided to the Court in an amicus brief and appears, in part, as an 
appendix to Justice Powell's opinion. Choosing Elites provides a 
more detailed description of the selection process at Harvard Col-
lege and places that program in a larger and more meaningful 
context. 
The title of this book implies that admission procedures carried 
out at a variety of colleges and other institutions will be examined. 
This is not the case. The focus is almost exclusively on selection at 
Harvard University. This is not as great a loss as it might seem 
because Harvard has, over the years, used a number of different 
admission procedures within its various programs of study. In ad-
dition there is great variety in the procedures currently being used. 
This variety in procedures over time and space, within a single insti-
tution, allows Klitgaard to examine their underlying rationale in 
some detail, a process which includes interviews with knowledgea-
ble parties in each program. 
The current diversity of selection programs at Harvard is strik-
ing. As Klitgaard puts it: 
Someone interested in how to choose an elite will not find an explicitly worked out 
and empirically justified policy for doing so anywhere at Harvard. Instead, one 
discovers divergent views, strongly held but seldom validated in ways that academi· 
cians would validate propositions in their chosen fields of study, and procedures 
that persist out of habit and custom. 
This situation is typical of that found at many fine universities. 
It raises a number of important issues over which everyone involved 
in the selection process has agonized. In my opinion, the most ago-
nizing issue is the role of unvalidated human judgment in the selec-
tion process. As Klitgaard shows, and many of us have experienced 
in our own work on selection committees, each committee (and 
sometimes the same committee from year to year) develops its own 
theory of what the entering class should "be like." This theory then 
generates a further set of assumptions about what characteristics 
lead to success within the configuration that defines the desired 
class. In selection jargon, neither the selector variables (the charac-
teristics), nor the criterion (the desired outcome), are fixed. 
It is widely believed that scholarly excellence is the major basis 
for selecting students at elite institutions. As Klitgaard points out, 
Harvard College specifically denies having chosen its student body 
in this manner for the last thirty years. Why this apparent contra-
diction? The purported reason is that most students who apply and 
are selected come from the right "tail" of the distribution of "tal-
ent." They have, in other words, been academically successful and 
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score very high on selection test batteries such as the Scholastic Ap-
titude Test (SAT). This is the main reason why selection commit-
tees and admissions officers feel so free to introduce human 
judgment into the selection process. An example of the reasoning 
involved is given in the last paragraph of the description of the 
Harvard College selection procedure: 
The further refinements sometimes required help to illustrate the kind of signifi-
cance attached to race. The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to 
fill, might find itself forced to choose between A, the child of a successful black 
physician in an academic community with promise of superior academic perform-
ance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents 
whose academic achievement was lower but who had demonstrated energy and 
leadership as well as an apparently-abiding interest in black power. If a good 
number of black students much like A but few like B had already been admitted, 
the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa. If C, a white student with extraordi-
nary artistic talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality 
might give him an edge over both A and B. Thus, the critical criteria are often 
individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associ-
ated with it. 5 
This procedure bears all the hallmarks of rationality and good 
sense. But is it good sense? Is it fair? Is it reasonable? These ques-
tions are political and social; they cannot be answered by "experts." 
How does the procedure work? Will it work the way the presenter 
asserts it will? Is the theory of selection valid? These, by contrast, 
are questions that can be answered by experts. 
The problem of clinical versus statistical prediction is an old 
issue in psychology. In lay terms, the question is whether one can 
predict a candidate's performance (as a student, a professor, a law-
yer, or what-have-you) better after interviewing him, or some other 
subjective procedure, than by rigid statistical methods. Most people 
believe that they can, but the evidence suggests otherwise. The fun-
damental problems were systematically organized and evaluated in 
1955 by Paul Meehl.6 A large body of evidence, encompassing 
many new problems of prediction, has accumulated on this topic 
and it all points toward the same conclusion: human judges are 
susceptible to multiple sources of error rendering it improbable that 
they will predict well and certain that they will do less well than 
statistical procedures. Human judgment in the form of individual-
ized evaluations is more likely to lead to results that are arbitrary 
rather than fair or valid. 7 
Klitgaard takes it for granted that there are fundamental indi-
5. /d. at 324. 
6. P. MEEHL, CLINICAL V. STATISTICAL PREDICTION (1955). 
7. See generally R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980). 
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vidual differences in a wide range of talents, skills, and abilities, and 
that elites cluster at the high end of the distribution of these traits. 
Indeed, those individuals who apply for positions in elite institu-
tions are already a highly self-selected population. The problem is 
thus one of selection and prediction "at the right tail." This stance 
does not imply that these traits are inherited or fixed, nor does it 
assume that individuals low in these traits cannot succeed. It does 
imply that, given these differences and the fact that resources are 
limited, everyone cannot be given an opportunity to enroll at 
Harvard in order to find out if indeed they are capable of complet-
ing the program. Choices must be made. The author also recog-
nizes that every society is characterized by diversity in the 
composition of its population. There clearly are group differences 
(sex, age, race, religious background, social class), as well as indi-
vidual differences. All of these differences raise issues of fairness in 
the allocation of scarce resources. 
It is not widely appreciated how old and pervasive these 
problems really are. Marco Polo introduced the idea of a civil ser-
vice system (including testing and selection) to the West on the ba-
sis of his experiences in China. It was quickly recognized as 
superior to the various spoils systems. He appears not to have 
warned us that the Chinese had already had to deal with the issue of 
ethnic, regional and class differences.s It was a problem whose so-
lution eluded the Chinese then and it continues to elude modern 
psychometricians. The reason it has eluded us is simple. It is not a 
technical problem. It is a social, political and philosophical 
problem.9 
Klitgaard wisely does not attempt to provide a solution. In-
stead he seeks to furnish frameworks for decisionmaking which can 
be used given a particular set of objectives. In my opinion, he suc-
ceeds admirably. He does this by providing a clear and detailed 
review of how admission procedures function, the techniques of pre-
diction and selection, the evidence on the effectiveness of selection, 
and finally a lucid discussion of the problem of representation of 
groups. 
One of the strangest features of Bakke, perhaps, was the 
Court's failure to mention the question of test bias. Some have ar-
gued that consideration of this problem would have led to adjust-
8. W. FRANKE, THE REFORM AND ABOLITION OF THE TRADITIONAL CHINESE Ex-
AMINATION (1961). 
9. See Snyderman & Rothman, Science, Politics, and the IQ Controversy, Spring 1986, 
THE Pun. INTEREST 79, for an interesting discussion of this problem. 
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ments and corrections for invalid admissions criteria.w With 
respect to the question of predictive bias (the extent to which tests 
are predictively biased against certain groups), the evidence as Klit-
gaard reports it is quite to the contrary: 
Differences in scores cannot be attributed to predictive bias in the tests. Indeed, 
predictions made using test scores and high-school grades actually overstate the 
later performance of blacks relative to whites. Compared to whites with the same 
test scores, blacks on average underperform in college, in graduate schools, and on 
some measures of job performance .... Whatever its causes, overprediction means 
that for racially unbiased academic prediction at the right tail, blacks' scores should 
be adjusted downward by perhaps a standard deviation. 
While his treatment of the facts is excellent, Klitgaard leads 
the reader to believe that little work has been done on the problem 
of bias in mental testing. This is incorrect. There is now a large 
literature devoted to this topic and the field has developed an elabo-
rate quantitative technology .11 The overall results are highly 
favorable to standardized tests, a conclusion that Klitgaard arrives 
at somewhat independently. 
Among the qualified, how does one choose? One of the most 
widely cited arguments against the use of standardized tests (and 
one can substitute the term intelligence tests without doing violence 
to the arguments) is that these instruments focus on a vary narrow 
range of human characteristics, namely academic abilities. This ar-
gument has been presented by both lay critics of testing and some 
scholarly critics, 12 but it is not accepted by most scholars in the 
domain of mental measurement.D There have been numerous at-
tempts to redefine the concept of human abilities to encompass a 
larger range of behavior and numerous attempts to relate other 
characteristics besides abilities to academic success. As Klitgaard 
grudgingly admits, none of these attempts have been successful. 
Klitgaard's conclusions were a surprise to him and will come as a 
surprise to many of his lay readers: 
This tentative conclusion depends of course on many value judgments, but its pri-
mary source was factual: given the current state-of-the-art prediction at the right 
tail, selective universities will do better achieving their objectives by choosing the 
10. See White, Culturally Biased Testing and Predictive Invalidity: Putting Them on the 
Record, 14 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 89 (1979). 
11. See R. BERK, HANDBOOK OF METHODS FOR DETECTING TEST BIAS ( 1982); A. 
JENSEN, BIAS IN MENTAL TESTS (1980); A. JENSEN, STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT MENTAL 
TESTS (1981); Kaplan, The Controversy Related to the Use of Psychological Tests, in HAND-
BOOK OF INTELLIGENCE: THEORIES, MEASUREMENTS, AND APPLICATIONS 465 (B. Wol-
man ed. 1985). 
12. H. GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES 
(1983); S. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981). 
13. See Brody, The Validity of Tests of Intelligence, in HANDBOOK OF INTELLIGENCE, 
supra note 11; Snyderman & Rothman, supra note 10. 
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academically ablest students, with appropriate allowance for the representation of 
groups. We simply cannot predict much of interest with the other intuitively pleas-
ing criteria now available. 
These conclusions are, in my opinion, sound and well sup-
ported by the available evidence. 
OUT OF ORDER: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE 
CRISIS OF DOCTRINAIRE LIBERALISM. By Nicholas 
Capaldi.I Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books. 1985. Pp. 
x, 201. $17.95. 
Mary/ee C Tay/or2 
In this book, Nicholas Capaldi endeavors to persuade us that 
liberalism is bad, that it dominates university culture, and that one 
of its pernicious outgrowths is affirmative action. We are told at the 
outset: "[A]ffirmative action was the inevitable consequence of the 
social philosophy known as doctrinaire liberalism, ... doctrinaire 
liberalism is the entrenched philosophy of academic social sci-
ence, ... affirmative action very nearly destroyed the university as 
a viable, independent institution-and it would have if that policy 
had remained unchecked." 
Since affirmative action is such a central target for Capaldi, I 
will begin by considering his description of affirmative action and its 
social context. I will then look at Capaldi's theoretical depiction of 
liberalism. 
I 
Capaldi attempts to attack the foundation of affirmative action, 
which he identifies as "the assumption that the potential of blacks is 
roughly equivalent to that of whites." Elsewhere he explains his 
meaning: in line with their assumption that talent is proportionally 
distributed across races and sexes, affirmative action proponents in-
terpret unequal outcomes to reveal unequal societal treatment in 
need of remedy. Capaldi is right on this. Phrased differently, un-
less one believes that races or sexes differ in potential or natural 
talent, social factors become the only reasonable explanations for 
differences in outcomes. He is also right in noting that we do not 
I. Professor of Philosophy, Queens College, CUNY. 
2. Associate Professor of Sociology, Pennsylvania State University. 
